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Only when the United States started experienc-  at the United States where - as in Europe-
ing tough competition in world markets did the  the most subsidized exports are agricultural
questions of fair trade and export subsidies move  exports that injure industries not in the importing
to center stage in the intemational trade discus-  countries but in other agricultural exporting
sions.  But is "fair trade" a will-o'-the-wisp?  countries.
The 1970s Tokyo Round of multilateral  Altemative approaches to that of the Subsi-
trade negotiations produced a Subsidies Code.  dies Code are:
But neither subsidies nor countervailing actions
have been constrained to the extent that negotia-  *  Ignore domestic subsidies in exporting
tors of the code hoped.  The code has evoked  countries and fncus only on export subsidies.
discord, partly because "export-promoting
subsidy" is so difficult to define.  *  Ignore the distinction between fair and
unfair foreign competition and place all industry
The United States has been the chief imple-  safeguard actions on one track.
menter of countervailring  uuues (CVDs)-
many of them viewed as a form of harassement  *  Attack import barriers, not subsidies, for
by foreign exporters, particularly of manufac-  without barriers to imports the extent of assis-
tured products.  Few CVDs have heen targeted  tance tends to be limited by transparency and by
fiscal considerations.
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Subsidies  have  been  very  high  on the  agenda  of international  trade
negotiations  over  the  past  dozen  years  or so.  "Fair  trade",  a term  much  in
vogue  in  Britain  in the  late  nineteenth  century  as that  country  experienced
competition  for  its  manufactures  on the  international  market  (Bhagwati  and
Irwin,  1987),  has  returned  to  be important  in  the  vocabulary  of those  who
determine  the  pace  and  outcome  of international  trade  negotiations.  The
subsidization  of exports  is  commonly  regarded  as an unfair  trading  policy,  as
is the  "dumping"  of its  exports.
Import  tariffs  designed  to  countervail  export  subsidies  have  a long
history. In 1890,  the  United  States  passed  legislation  to  countervail  foreign
subsidies  on sugar  (Hufbauer  and  Shelton  Erb, 1984,  p.45),  while  rules
governing  the  use  of export  subsidies  and  countervailing  import  tariffs  have2
been  part  of the  General  Agreement  on Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT)  since  its
inception  in 1947. But  it  has  only  been since  the  United  States  started  to
feel  seveve  competition  on  world  markets  that  the  question  of subsidies  has
been  moved  to the  centre  of the  international  stage. The  United  States  is  by
far  the  largest  implementer  of countervailing  import  duties  (CVDs).
One  of the  main  products  of the  Tokyo  Round  of  multilateral  trade
negotiations,  which  concluded  in 1979,  was  a "Code"  which  interpreted  and
extended  the  GATT  provisions  relating  to subsidies  and  countervailing
duties. The  provisions  of this  Code relate  mainly  to  manufactured  products  --
the  Code,  and  the  GATT  itself,  contain  relatively  weak  restrictions  on
subsidies  for  agr.culture.  More recently,  subsidies  affecting  r  lture
have  been  receiving  rather  more  attention  --  efficient  agriculture!  exporting
countries  have  long  complained  about  loss  of  markets  due  to  agricultural
suhsidies  in  Europe  and  elsewhere.
This  paper  addresses  the  questions  of what  is  a subsidy,  which
subsidies  affect  international  trade,  and  why  countries  may  wish  to subsidize,
particularly  exporting  industries.  It  considers  the  effects  of these
subsidies  on other  countries  and  why trading  partners  may  wish  to  outlaw  or
countervail  such  export-promoting  subsidies.  The  paper  then  outlines  the
provisions  of the  CATT  and  the  Subsidies  Code  as they  relate  to subsidies;
this  is followed  by some  data  on the  extent  to which  these  provisions  have
been  used,  and  by a consideration  of the  purposes  for  which  they  appear,  in
fact,  to  have  been  used. The  question  is then  raised  as to  whether  or not  the
proscribing/countervailing  approach  is in fact  the  best  way to  constrain
subsidies  and  whether,  i(  such  control  is  desired,  other  approaches  may be
preferable  and  feasible. To anticipate,  it is  suggested  that  there  is,  and3
can  be,  no completely  common  ground  on what  is  and  is not  a subsidy,  or even
an  export-promoting  subsidy,  and  that  the  processes  for  seeking  countervailing
duties  are  so open  .o  abuse  in practice,  that  beyond  a very limited  range  of
subsidies,  the  proscribing/countervailing  approach  is  unlikely  to be
productive.  To provide  assistance  to producers  while  limiting  the  demands  on
the  r blic  purse,  most  subsidies  of consequence  to international  trade  are
buttressed  by barriers  to imports  to the  countries  granting  the  subsidies.
Reducing  these  barriers  while  maintaining  the  same  level  of price  support  to
major  industries  would  be  very  costly  to national  treasuries.  This  cost is
likely  to increase  the  political  cost  of the  subsidies  and thus  constrain
them.
II. What is  a Subsidy?
(i)  Level  Playing  Fields
In  recent  years  there  has  been  a great  deal  of talk  by politicians
and  others  regarding  "level  playing  fields". Such  a field  appears  to  be
viewed  as one in  which  firms  compete  for  markets  without  assistance  from  their
governments,  that  is,  without  subsidies  in  one  form  or  another. But in
considering  which  government  actions  may  be regarded  as providing  subsidies,
the  term  subsidy  can  be  all-embracing.  Virtually  every  government  action  can
be regarded  as  a subsidy  for  someone. And  virtually  all such  actions  can
impact  on exports. Even  a requirement  that  domestically  manufactured  flags  be
flown  on government  buildings  provides  assistance  for  flag  makers.  By giving  a
secure  home  market  and  promoting  economies  of scale,  such  a regulation  may4
assist  potential  exporters. Is it  to be regarded  as an export  promoting
subsidy?
Confining  the  concept  of a subsidy  to  where  there  is  a direct
transfer  of goods,  services  or money  from  the  government  limits  the  field  but
does  not  solve  all the  problems. Such  a definition  would  exclude  tax
exemptions,  freedom  from  environmental  regulations,  etc.  Furthermore,  how
specific  does the  transfer  have to  be to  count  as a subsidy? Paving  a
suburban  road  out  of public  funds  assists  all  business  firms  that  use  the
road,  and  so  does  the  building  of a road  to  a remote  mining  site. To
calculate  whether  subsidies  are involved  in  each  case  involves  complicated
calculations  of costs,  use,  and  taxes  -id  by the  users. Also  there  is  no
general  agreement  as to  what  constitutes  a "proper"  role  of government  in  many
forms  of economic  activity --  education,  for  example. is  "free"  education
for  electronic  wizards  a subsidy  for  the  electronics  industry? But  what  if
education  is free  for  all  professio..s  and  skills? Does it involve  a subsidy
only if  it is  free  for  some  skills  and  not  for  others?
But  there  are  other  more  subtle  problems. There  are  many  other  forms
of assistance  in an  economy  that  have  very  similar  effects  to direct
subsidies.  For  example,  taxing  the  imports  of cars  assists  the  domestic  car
manufacturing  industry  just  as surely  as  does  a direct  subsidy  to that
industry. What is  the  logic  of regarding  one  as fair  assistance  and  the  other
as unfair? And  then  there  are  very indirect  effects:  subsidizing  imports  of
some  products  will,  through  its  indirect  effects  on the  exchange  rate  for
example,  assist  exporters  of other  products  (in  the  same  country)  much  as
would  a subsidy  paid  directly  to  them.  But  who  would  argue  that  subsidies  to5
imports  of manufactured  goods  provides  unfair  assistance  to agricultural
exporters  of the  same  country?
All  this  may  be counted  as no  more than  sophistry  were it  not for  the
pressure  emanating  from  the  Unite('  "  3tes  in  particular,  regarding  "level
playing  fields"  in international  coi erce. Given  this  focus,  is it then
possible  to  attempt  to limit  the  argument  to  defining  types  of subsidies  that
are  of concern  to international  trade? Enough  has  been  said  already  to
indicate  that  focussing  on impacts  on international  trade  does  not  make things
much  easier,  for  there  can  be few  government  actions  that  do not  have  effects,
however  indirect,  on exports  or imports. To limit  the  coverage,  the
international  negotiating  community  has  concentrated  mainly  on those  actions
that  assist  industries  rather  directly  to compete  on their  export  markets.
Subsidies  for imports  are  rare  and  as they  benefit  foreign  exporters  have  been
ignored  in international  negotiations.  Subsidies  for  import-competing
production  have  had  relatively  little  attention  paid  to them. Barriers  to
imports  have  always  been  of  major  concern  to the  negotiators  but,  by and  large
discussion,  negotiation,  and  rules  regarding  barriers  to trade  have  been  kept
quite  separate  form  those  relating  to export-promoting  subsidies.
(ii) Export  and  Domestic  Subsidies
With  the  attention  narrowed  in this  way,  another  distinction  is  of
importance.  This is  between  those  subsidies  that  directly  promote  exports  and
those  which  do so incidentally.  The  contrast  is  between  a subsidy  on exports
per  se,  and  a subsidy  that  assists  the  production  of particular  industries  but
which  impacts  on  exports  when some  of the  output  is exported. The  attempt  to6
provide  specific  rules  in  an international  forum  to control  the  use  of the
latter,  dcmestic,  form  of subsidy  under  is  relatively  new.
It is  relatively  easy  to  define  an export  subsidy,  at least  in
principle. It is  any  government  action  that  discriminates  between  sales  for
the  domestic  and  foreign  markets,  and  favours  the  latter. A domestic  subsidy,
on the  other  hand,  relates  to  all  production  whatever  its  destination.
Discrimination  according  to  destination  is the  core  of the  matter. But  even
this  relatively  clear  and  simple  concept  runs  into  problems. The following
are  some  of them.
5i)  When  a country  has  a system  of value  added  taxation,  is  the
exemption  from  such  taxation  of the  value  added  on exports  to  be regarded  as
an export  subsidy? The  generally  accepted  answer  to this  is  that  countries
choose  between  origin  and  destination  forms  of value  added  taxation. A
destination  based  tax,  which  is the  coimnon  form  of the  tas,  applies  the  full
value  value  added  tax  to iwnports  and  zero  rates  exports. Such  treatment  is
not  generally  regarded  as  an export  subsidy.
(ii)  A country  may  have  a plethora  of import  restrictions  and  export
taxes  and  subsidies.  A subsidy  on the  export  of product  X may  be doing
nothing  more  than  partially  negating  the  adverse  effects  on exports  of  X of
all  the  other  taxes  on trade. Is such  a subsidy  really  a subsidy? What  if
product  X itself  bears  export  taxes  as well  as export  subsidies? Should  they
be  netted  out  to  calculate  a net  tax  or subsidy? (The  answer  to this  may seem
obviouts,  but  such  netting  out is  not  allowed  under  the  United  States'
countervailing  duty  law.)
(iii)  Is  a production  subsidy  to be regarded  as an export  subsidy
when  there  are  nc,  or few,  domestic  sales? If so,  what  is the  dividing  line?7
(iv)  Is  exemption  for  a particular  product  from  an export  tax  that
other  exported  products  must  bear  to be regarded  as an export  subsidy?
(v)  If  different  products  are  exported  at different  exchange  rates,
how is  one  to calculate  whether  one  product's  exchange  rate  is  to be regarded
as a subsidizing  or taxing  exchange  rate?
(vi)  Favourable  credit  terms  for  exports  are  clearly  a form  of
subsidy. But  what  if  credit  in general  is  rationed  and  exporters  (or
exporters  of some  products)  are  able  to  get  credit  more  readily  than  others?
Is this  a subsidy? How  could  the  subsidy  element  of such  treatment  be
calculated?
(vii)  Is  the  refund  of import  duty  on the  imported  content  of exports
to  be regarded  as an export  subsidy? If  not,  then  how  many stages  back  in the
production  process  does  one  allow  for  such  import  duty  refunds? (For  example,
does  one  allow  refunds  of duty  paid  on imports  used  by  a supplier  to the
-xporter,  or  by a supplier  to the  supplier? And  what  about  imported  capital
equipment  used  by the  exporter,  or imported  capital  equipment  used  by  a
supplier  of  components  to  the  exporter,  or by the  supplier's  supplier?)
Allowing  for  refunds  of tariffs  paid  by the  exporter  but  not  for  those  paid
earlier  in the  production  process  will  encourage  backward  integration  by
exporting  firms,  integration  that  may  have  no other  economic  merit.
(viii)  How  does  one  treat  the  special  favours  that  are sometimes
given  to  export  processing  zones  with  respect  to labour  laws,  infrastructure,
tax  treatment  etc.?
(ix)  How  is  one  to  determine  whether  exports  are  subsidized  in  non-
market  economies?
These  questions  are the  bread  and  butter  of trade  lawyers. Many  are8
complex,  but  at  least  the  answers  can  be  related  to  a  clear  principle  --
differential  treatment  according  to  destination.  In  the  case  of  do.nestic
subsidies  that  may  impact  on  exports,  however,  even  the  principle  is  not
clear,  despite  attempts  to  deal  with  it  through  the  specificity  of
subsidies.  Here  a  fundamental  problem  revolves  around  what  is,  and  is  not,  a
normal  or  proper  function  of  government.  Much  blood  has  been  spilt  over  this
issue,  and  the  attempt  by  one  country's  government  to  take  actions  through
counterveiling  duties  against  other  countries  according  to  what  it  deem'  be
the  appropriate  role  of  government  (which  may  differ  from  the  view  of  the  next
government  in  the  same  country),  or  to  obtain  a  ruling  from  a  multilateral
body  regarding  this  role,  is  doomed  to  irritate  and,  probably,  fail.
To  illustrate  the  point,  the  following  are  some  of  the  questions  that
have  arisen  in  relation  to  foreign  challenges  to  domestic  subsidies.  (Mundheim
and  Ehrenhaft,  1984,  pp.95-107)
(i)  While  free  general  education  may  not  be  regarded  as  being  a
subsidy,  does  the  subsidization  of  the  education  of  horticulturalists  give  an
unfair  advantage  to  flower  exporters?
(ii)  Does  apartheid  in  South  Africa  give  an  unfair  advantage  to  South
African  steel  exporters?
(iii)  Does  the  building  of  a  wharf  by  a  government  provide  a subsidy
for  fish  producers  and  exporters?
(iv)  Is  the  amount  charged  by  fihe  government  to  exploiters  of  a
resource  on  public  land  relevant  in  determining  whether  exports  of  this
resource  are  subsidized,  even  when  the  charge  is  the  same  whether  or  not  the
resource  is  exported?9
(v)  tZovernment  subsidies  to  the  European  consortium  building  the
Airbus  are  regarded  by some  in the  U.S.  aircraft  industry  as  comprising  unfair
competition.  To others  they  appear  little  different  from  the  assistance  the
U.S.  industry  obtains  through  large  contracts  for  military  and space  research
and  development.
(vi:  Are  research  and  development  grants  to  be regarded  as export-
promoting  subsidies,  even  when the  promotion  of exports  as such  is  not  an aim
of  the  grants?
Leaving  the  problems  of defining  and  measuring  subsidies,  we now turn
to  consider  why  governments  may  choose  consciously  to subsidize  particular
activities,  and  particularly  when  these  subsidies  are  perceived  to  have
impacts  on international  trade.
III. Why  Subsidize?
Like  all  forms  of  government  favours,  subsidies  may  be  granted  for  a
number  of reasons,  many  of  which  may  be more  of a political  than  an economic
nature. We focus  here  on those  reasons  which  may be termed  economic,  in  that
the  intent  of the  government  is  to  affect  the  structure  of the  economy  in  a
manner  that  it  deems  to be  of general  benefit  to the  country's  citizens.
Before  turning  to  export-promoting  subsidies,  the  point  should  be made  that  if
a government  wishes  to encourage  a particular  activity,  a subsidy  for  that
activity,  paid  for  out  of  general  taxation,  will  usually  be the  most  efficient
way  in  which  to  do it.  (Corden,  1974,  Chapters  2-4) That  is,  if  a government
wishes  to encourage  production  of product  X, it could  do so  by means  of aio
direct  subsidy  to production,  by imposing  barriers  to imports  of import-
competing  goods  (tariffs  or quantitative  restrictions  on imports,  domestic
content  requirements  as  a condition  of domestic  production,  and so  on),  or  by
subsidizing  exports. A production  subsidy  will  tend  to  be the  most efficient
means  of  assistance  because  it  does  not  tend  to raise  the  price  of product  X
to  domestic  ussr&S  of  X --  it  does  not  discourage  the  domestic  use  of the
product  the  production  of which  it is  designed  to  encourage.
In some  instances,  complications  in  administering  a production
subsidy,  or  difficulties  in administering  a production  subsidy  or in  raising
the  taxes  to  pay  for  it,  may shift  the  efficient  Choice  towards,  say,  an
import  tariff  (though  probably  never  towards  quantitative  restrictions  or
content  schemes),  or an import  tariff  combined  with  an  equal  export  subsidy,  a
combination  that  does  not  discriminate  in favor  of production  for  the  home
market. Howe-'er  there  is  a strong  prima  facie  case  for  direct  subsidies  for
the  production  of  X, if increased  production  of  X is  the  objective. It should
be noted  that  the  objective  is being  taken  for  granted  --  it is  another  matter
to  ask  whether  the  objective  itself  is  sensible.  The  position  is simply  that
if  increased  production  of  X is the  (bjective a subsidy  on the  production  of
X will,  in  general,  be the  most  economically  efficient  manner  in  which  to
achieve  it.  Similarly  if  a more  technically  educated  citizenry  is  desired  ,  a
subsidy  on technical  education  will  tend  to  be the  most  economic  way to
achieve  it,  all  things  considered,  rather  than  a subsidy  on the  production  of
high  technology  products,  or a barrier  to the  imports  of these  goods. Again,
if  export  promotion  is  desired,  i  subsidy  on exports  may  be the  most  efficient
way  to  achieve  it,  though  this  proposition  is  now the  subject  of further
examination.11
Perhaps  the  main  reasons  for  governments  seeking  to promote  exports
are  nou  too  dissimilar  from  the  ideas  associated  with  the  so-called
mercantilists,  the  intellectual  foundations  of  *4nich  appeared  to be attacked
so successfully  by  Adam  Smith  two  hundred  years  ago. Very  often  the  concepts
are  dressed  up in  new  and  sometimes  sophisticated  clothing,  for  the  idea  that
exports  are  of special  value  to  a country  is  particularly  durable. The idea
has  been fostered  by the  success  of export-oriented  countries,  for  example
Japan  and  the  Republic  of  Korea,  by the  pressing  demands  of the  servicing  of
debts  in  many  countries,  and  by the  need,  in  countries  adopting  an inward-
oriented  development  strategy,  to pay  for  essential  imports.
For  countries  in  which  the  structure  of trade  policy  is  geared  to
shield  industries  from  import  competition,  it  can  be argued  that  exports  are
indeed  generally  of  more  value  than  other  forms  of production.  Policies  that
restrict  imports  tend  to appreciate  a country's  real  exchange  rate (that  is,
raise  the  relation  between  a country's  price  level  and  the  price  level  abroad)
and  thereby  make  exporting  less  attractive  as compared  with  producing  for  the
home  market. Export-promoting  subsidies  then  help  to  offset  this  anti-export
bias. While  it  would  be  more  efficient  to remove  the  policies  that  cause  this
bias  against  exports,  in the  absence  of such  removal  export  promotion  may,
within  limits,  improve  the  efficiency  of  resource  allocation  in a country.
Indeed  there  is  considerable  evidence  that  export  promotion  in  South  Korea  in
the  1960s  and  1970s  did  little  more than  offset  the  bias  against  exports
produced  by support  for  import-competing  industries.
It is  another  question,  of course,  as to  whether  this  policy  of
protection  "all  round"  --  providing  it  for  exporting  as well  as for  import-
competing  industries  --  will in  fact  bring  improved  resource  allocation. It12
can  all  too  easily  develop  into  a  political  economy  in  which  returns  to
investment  in influencing  the  government  exceed  the  returns  on investing  in
meeting  the  demands  for  goods  and  services.  A more  efficient  policy  could  be
to  remove  the  barriers  to imports  but,  given  these  barriers,  export  subsidies
that  are  generally  available  will  tend  to  improve  the  productive  efficiency  ef
a country.
Apart  from  countering  the  anti-export  bias  of other  policies,  what
other  economic  reasons  are  there  for  promoting  exports? As with  all  forms  of
ass.stance,  'external  economies"  may  provide  a rationale  --  that  is  there  may
be benefits  that  accrue  to other  members  of the  country  for  which  the  exporter
receives  no compensation.  Coods  that  tend  to  generate  such  external  economies
will  in  general  tend  to be  under-produced  unless  their  production  is
encouraged  by  government  support. What  are  these  beneficial  external  effects
that  may  flow  from  exports? It is  perhaps  easier  to  state  the  concept  than  to
find  specific  examples. One  example  often  mentioned  is  the  benefits  that  can
flow  to  other  potential  exporters  from  the  pioneering  of a  market. Often,
however,  the  pioneering  firm  will itself  be  able  to recoup  much  of the
benefits  from  pioneering  (e.g.  by acting  as  an agent  for  other  firms,  or
selling  its  consulting  services)  in  which  case  it  may be  well  recompensed  for
the  benefits  it gives  to other  firms. But  because  they  perceive  potential
benefits,  governments  often  subsidize  market  development,  or provide  trade
development  and  information  services  out  of  the  public  purse.
Another  reason  advanced  for  subsidizing  exporters,  in  this  case  in
the  forms  loan  subsidies  or  risk  insurance,  is  that  commercial  insurers  or
lenders  may  not  be  prepared  to  meet  the  risks  they  perceive  on export  markets,
or that  their  charges  for  doing  so  may  appear  to be  exorbitant.  In some13
markets  these  risks  may include  expropriation  of property  with  uncertain
compensation,  or the  imposition  of exchange  controls  that  do not  permit  the
repatriation  of profits. Whether  in  these  circumstances  there  is a  market
failure  that  would  warrant  the  government  stepping  in  would  need  investigation
in particular  cases;  it  could  of course  simply  be  that  commercial  lenders  and
insurers  are  making  a correct  assessment  of the  risks  involved.
The  existence  of  a large  external  debt  and  the  difficulty  of
servicing  it  may  lead  some  governments  to subsidize  exports,  although  the
countries  that  are  attempting  to promote  exports  in this  way  appear  often  to
be countering  the  anti-export  bias  of other  policies. Indeed  debt itself  does
not  provide  a case  for  subsidizing  exports. Production  that  reduces  imports
also  provides  the  means  to  service  debt  --  what  is required  is  an increase  in
the  production  of tradeable  goods  and  services  relative  to the  demand  for
them. So the  existence  of a debt  servicing  problem  may  provide  a case  for
promoting  all  tradeable  production  (for  example  by attempting  to depreciate
the  real  exchange  rate)  rather  than  for  subsidizing  exports  as such.
A  form  of export  prcmotion  that  has  received  much  attention  in  recent
years  is  that  associated  with strategic  trade  policy. This  term  is  used in  a
variety  of ways,  each  implying  that  government  assistance  would  enable  a firm
to  achieve  an objective  in international  markets,  of  national  benefit,  that
would  not  have  been  achievable  without  the  assistance.  This  implies  that  the
probable  benefits,  whether  they  spill  over  into  the  rest  of the  economy  or are
captured  entirely  by the  firm  and  its  workers,  are  expected  to  exceed  the
probable  total  costs  incurred,  including  the  costs  of the  government
assistance  and  those  imposed  on domestic  consumers  and  firms. The  essence  of
the  idea  is  to assist  in  a competitive  strategy  in  what is  essentially  a trade14
war  with  foreign  firms  and/or  governments.  The  aim  of the  strategy  may  be
sustaining  or  developing  a leading  technological  edge  (secure  and/or  large
scale  production  being  judged  to  be  necessary  for  the  acquisition  and
development  of this  technology)  and  then  obtaining  the  returns  attributable  to
being  first  with  the  new technology;  obtaining  economies  of scale  that  would
then  enable  unassisted  survival  on the  world  market;  simply  driving
competitors  out  of an  oligopolistic  market;  or  attempting  to persuade  a
foreign  government  to  desist  from  practices  deemed  to  be harmful  to the  home
country. Tle scope  of strategic  trade  policy  has  been somewhat  circumscribed
by the  GATT,  but  as it  becomes  more  popular  and,  in some  quarters  --  including
the  quarters  of some  professional  economists-/  --  gains  a respectability  it
lost  in the  1930s  (albeit  dressed  then  in  somewhat  different  clothes),  it  can
be expected  to place  more  and  more  pressure  on GATT. Whether  or not  there  is
substance  to the  charge,  the  allegation  that  the  export  success  of foreigners,
particularly  in "new"  products,  is  due  to  assistance  from  their  governments,
is  a potent  political  argument  for  like  treatment.
IV.  Effects  on  Other  Countries
In  considering  the  impact  of export-promoting  sudsidies  on other
countries,  it  is  helpful  to  make  a distinction  between  those  of  a strategic
nature,  as  referred  to in  the  previous  paragraph,  and  those  that  are
1.  A notable  criticism  of these  views  is  provided  by Jagdish  Bhagwati  in  his
acceptance  speech  on the  occasion  of the  award  of the  Bernhard  Harms  Prize,
Kiel,  June  25,  1988.15
introduced  for  other  reasons.  As far  as strategic  policies  are  concerned,  and
to the  extent  that  the  strategies  have  a valid  economic  base,  countries  that
are  the  targets  of the  strategies  are  likely  to be  harmed  by the  policies.
The  appropriate  nature  of the  response  will  be determined  by perceptions  of
the  nature  of the  "game"  being  played. (Conybeare,  1987,  provides  an
exposition  of various  game  plans  and  relates  them  to  actual  trade  wars  of the
past.) Of course  it  could  be that  the  supposed  strategies  of foreigners  are
more  in the  minds  of the  beholders  than  in reality,  or that  they  are
misconceived  or ineffectual,  in  all  of which  cases  an appropriate  response  my
be to  abstain  from  a game  of  competitive  shooting  oneself  in  the  foot.  But
even  if  misconceived,  foreigners'  trade  strategies  could  be damaging  and  may
warrant  a policy  of offsetting  the  effects,  or of  attempting  to  get  them to
desist,  rather  than  joining  the  strategic  battle  as such. Small  countries,
that  cannot  affect  their  terms  of trade,  of course  have  no scope  for  strategic
trade  actions.
As far  as non-strategic  subsidies  are  concerned,  an important
economic  point  is that  all  export-promoting  subsidies,  to  the  extent  that  they
lower  the  export  prices  of the  subsidizing  countries,  improve  the  terms  of
trade  of other  countries,  considered  as a  whole. This  does  not  mean  that  the
terms  of trade  of other  countries  that  are  competing  on the  export  market  will
be improved  --  on the  contrary,  they  will  be  worsened. But if  a country  is  a
net exporter  of  a product,  the  rest  of the  world  as a  whole  must  be a net
importer  of it.  Thus  an export  promoting  subsidy  for  a product  of which  a
country  is  a  net  exporter,  must  improve  the  terms  of trade  of the  rest  of the16
world  as a  whole. Net  importers'  of the  product  are  thus  benefitted  by
countries'  export  subsidies.
From  this  point  of view,  then,  export  promoting  subsidies  are  a
relatively  benign,  if  not  beneficial,  form  of interference  in  international
trade. They  may  be contrasted  with barriers  to  imports  which  in general
worsen  the  terms  of trade  of other  countries  as  a whole  and  thereby  have  a
detrimental  effect  upon them. (Snape,  1986) Those  export  subsidies  that,
from  this  perspective,  are  most  harmful  to  other  countries,  are those  where  an
importer  a  a product  has,  by  means  of the  subsidies,  been  turned  into  a
substantial  net  exporter  --  these  subsidies  are  inevitably  accompanied  by
major  barriers  to  imports  into  the  country  granting  them. As noted  below,
without  these  barriers  to imports,  the  subsidies  themselves  are  unlikely  to  be
maintained  at such  damaging  levels.  Why should  governments  of countries  that
can  benefit  from  improved  terms  of trade  seek  to  do anything  about  other
countries'  non-strategic  export  promoting  subsidies?
As so  often  occurs  in  economic  policy,  there  is  a conflict  here
between  the  interests  of the  nation  as a  whole  and  the  interests  of one
section  of it. And,  as also  so  often  happens,  those  who  interests  may  be
harmed  are  likely  to  be more  concentrated  and  to  have  a larger  per  capita  loss
than  those  who  gain,  even  though  the  gainers,  and  the  total  gain,  may  greatly
exceed  those  who  lose  and  the  total  loss. In the  political  race,  then,  the
specific  interests  that  are  harmed  by imports,  including  those  imports  that
are subsidized  as  exports  by foreign  governments,  are  likely  to have  a head
start. And  such  arguments  as:  "We  can  compete  with  Mexican  companies,  but  we
cannot  compete  with  the  Mexican  government"  (Chairman  of U.S.  Steel
Corporation,  letter  to the  editor,  The  Washington  Post,  December  9, 1983,17
p. A22)  strike  a chord  of sympathy  even  when  considerations  of  trade  strategy
are  not  involved,  and  of course  it is  a simple  matter  to suggest  that  they
are.
It is  curious  that  there  appears  to  be  widespread  acceptance  that  it
is  legitimate  for  foreign  governments  to  restrict  access  to their  domestic
markets,  and international  agreements  have  aimed  at proscribing  some  forms  of
this  protection  and  binding  and  negotiating  downwards  other  forms,  rather  than
proscribing  it  across-the-board.  On the  other  hand  the  view  is  widespread
that  it is  illegitimate  for  foreign  governments  to  assist  their  residents  to
export,  particularly  in  competition  with  "our"  producers. Thus  import
barriers  are  acceptable  (or  at least  some  forms  of them  are);  export  promotion
is  not  and  the  competition  resulting  from  this  is  often  branded  as unfair.
From  an economic  perspective  the  asymmetry  of attitudes  is rather  confusing,
as  also  is the  invocation  of fairness. The  distinction  between  fair  and
unfair  trade  tends  to  be as elusive  as that  other  economic  holy  grail  the
"just  price". There  is  no doubt  that  the  whole  concept  of fairness,  and  the
asymmetry  of attitudes  towards  trade  expanding  and  trade  contracting  actions,
are  heavily  producer-oriented  and  reflect  mercantilist  perceptions  of the  role
of international  trade  which  have  long  been  regarded  by the  bulk  of the
economics  profession  as fallacious.  Nevertheless  these  perceptions  do appear
to  have  a powerful  influence  on policy.
Protection  for  farmers  against  imports  has  for  long  been  regarded  by
governments  in  many  countries  as being  in a special  category. Whether  it  be
to  protect  a  way  of life  that  is  generally  respected,  to  attempt  to  guarantee
food  security  through  self-sufficiency,  to solve  a problem  of rural  poverty,
or simply  because  of the  political  power  of farmers  as a voting  coalition,18
price  support  and  other  assistance  for  agriculture  products  is  endemic  in
Europe,  Japan,  and  the  United  States,  in  particular.  (OECD,  1987) On the
international  stage,  the  perceived  problems  associated  with  subsidies  for
manufactured  products  have  largely  been  related  to injury  to import  competing
industries,  and  more  recently  to industrial  strategies  purportedly  aimed  at
achieving  a technological  edge.  For  agriculture,  however,  subsidies  have
largely  been  directed  towards  import  replacement,  and  have  led  to the
spilling-over  of production  on to export  markets,  there  to  compete  with  the
relatively  unsubsidized  exports  of  efficient  agricultural  exporting  countries.
V.  The  Rules
The  multilaterally  agreed-upon  rules  on subsidies  are  found  to  be
found  in  GATT,  as  modified  after  the  GATT  Review  of 1954-55,  and in  the
"Interpretation  and  Application"  of the  relevant  GATT  Articles  agreed  in 1979
as part  of the  outcome  of the  Tokyo  Round  of Multilateral  Trade  Negotiations
--  particularly  the  interpretation  and  application  usually  referred  to as the
Subsidies  Code. National  legislation  by  major  importing  countries  is
generally  consistent  with  these  internationally  agreed  rules. As the  United
States  has  for  long  been  a leader  in interpretation,  as part  of its
legislation  is  thought  by some  not  to  conform  to  the  provisions  of  GATT,  and
as there  has  been  a surge  of countervailing  duty  cases  there,  particular
attention  is  given  to  that  country,  as well  as to  agriculture  and  to
developing  countries,  for  both  of  which  there  are  special  provisions.19
(i)  The  Articles  of GATT
While  the  original  GA T Articles  as  agreed  in 1947  did  not  prohibit
either  production  or export  subsidies,  the  GATT  Review  of 1955  introduced  a
prohibition  of export  subsidies  that  result  in  a lower  price  for  manufactured
goods  on the  export  market  than  the  domestic  market  (Article  XVI:4). (In  fact
such  pricing  would  conform  to dumping,  as  defined  by the  GATT.)  A note  to this
paragraph  explains  that  the  intention  was to  abolish  "all  subsidies"
(presumably  all  subsidies  that  promote  exports  of manufactured  products,  for
there  are  separate  provisions  for  primary  products),  but  the  Article  itself
incorporates  the  dual  price  test  (i.e.,  export  prices  lower  than  domestic
prices)  to define  the  proscribed  subsidies.  While  export  subsidies  for
products  sold  competitively  may  be expected  to  bring  prices  on the  export
market  lower  than  on the  domestic  market,  production  subsidies  will  not tend
to  have  this  effect.11. The 1955  amendment  moved  the  GATT  closer  to the
Havana  Charter  for  the  stillborn  International  Trade  Organisation,  but,
significantly,  the  ITO  Charter  did  not  differentiate  between  manufactured  and
other  products  with  respect  to the  dual  pricing  test  --  all  export  subsidies
that  resulted  in lower  prices  on the  international  than  on the  domestic  market
were  to  be proscribed  (Jackson,  1969,  p.371). The  change  can  only  be  ascribed
to growth  of subsidized  agriculture  in industrial  countries  and  of the
1.  While  export  subsidies  can  be expected  to  have  this  effect  in  a competitive
market  structure,  and  indeed  it  may  have  been  the  intention  of this  test  to
discriminate  between  export  subsidies  and  other  subsidies,  export  subsidies
may  not  result  in  dual  pricing  when  producers  have  some  monopolistic
discretion  regarding  the  prices  they  charge. Indeed  the  threat  of
countervailing  action  in  the  presence  of  dual  pricing  would  provide  an
incentive  to  producers  not  to price  in  that  way.20
political  power  of agricultural  interests  in these  countries  in the
intervening  years.
As far  as primary  products  are  concerned,  the  GATT (as  revised  in
1955)  provides  that  "contracting  parties  shall  seek  to  avoid  the  use  of
subsidies  on the  export  of primary  products",  but if  they  do use  subsidies,
they  should  not  use  them  in  a manner  "which  results  in that  contracting  party
having  more  than  an  equitable  share  of world  trade  in that  product"  (Article
XVI:3),  a very  vague  prescription.  Domestic  subsidies  to  agriculture  and
barriers  to imports  of agricultural  products  have been  virtually  outside  GATT
control  since  a  waiver  was  granted  to  the  United  States  in 1955  for  the  import
restrictions  which  were  part  of its  agriculEural  price  support  program  (Dam,
1970,  p.260). Neverthelesr,  subsidization  of agricultural  exports  is  still,
in  principle,  under  GATT  pros.-ription  when these  subsidies  result  in  "more
than  an equitable  share  of  world  trade",  and in  any  case  they  are  open  to
countervailing  tariff  action  by importing  countries,  along  with  all  other
export  promoting  subsidies,  as noted  below. However,  the  inability  of  GATT
procedures  to  constrain  the  actions  of the  EEC  effectively  following
successful  complaints  under  the  GATT  by  Australia  and  Brazil  regarding
subsidized  sugar  exports,  leaves  little  doubt  that  such  subsidies  are  not
under  GATT  proscriptive  control  in  practice  (Teese,  1982).
The  GATT  Articles  permit  the  levying  of countervailing  duties,  no
greater  than  the  amount  of subsidy,!'  if the  government  of the  importing
country  determines  that  the  effects  of subsidies  are  such  as to cause  or
1.  The  relevant  Article  refers  to  "bounty  or subsidy  determined  to have  been
granted,  directly  or indirectly,  on the  manufacture,  production  or export  of
such  product  in  the  country  of  origin  or exportation,  including  any  special
subsidy  to the  transportation  of  a particular  product"  (Article  VI:3).21
threaten  "material"  injury  to  an industry  in its  country  (Article  VI: 6(a)).
It is  this  provision  which  has  been  most important  in  practice  in  discouraging
export-promoting  subsidies.ol  GATT  also  allows  countervailing  duties  by an
importer  (say  country  A) when  subsidized  exports  by country  B  are  displacing
the  exports  of  country  C in  A's  market,  and  this  loss  of exports  causes
material  injury  to an industry  in  C (Article  VI:  6(b)]. In  practice  country  A
may  have  no incentive  to  countervail  for  the  benefit  of an industry  in  C.
Article  XVI:  1  of GATT  provides  that  member  countries  must  notify
other  members  of any  subsidy  which  "operates  directly  or indirectly  to
increase  exports  of  any  product  form,  or to reduce  imports  of any  product
into,  its  territory"  and  also  of the  extent  and  nature  of  the subsidy  and the
estimated  effects  on exports  or imports,  but  it appears  that  this  is
frequently  not  observed. The  other  main  Article  of the  CATT  that  relates  to
subsidies  is  Article  XXIII  concerning  "nullification  or impairment"  of  any
benefits  accruing  under  the  Agreement. Thus  if a country,  in the  course  of
trade  negotiations,  had  agreed  to bind  a particular  tariff  (that  is,  in  CATT
language,  has  granted  a "concession"),  and  another  country  then  subsidized
exports  so  as to  get  "under"  that  tariff,  "nullification  and impairment"  could
be  deemed  to occur. The  matter  could  then  be referred  to  members  of GATT  for
multilateral  resolution  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of that  Article.
Negotiated  benefits  accruing  to the  offending  party  could  be suspended.
1.  Export  stabilization  schemes  for  primary  products  are  not  deemed  to  be
subsidies  that  can  trigger  countervailing  actions  or to result  in "@more  than
an  equitable  share  of  world  trade"  as long  as  export  prices  on occasion  rise
higher  than  domestic  prices  (Articles  VI:  7  and  XVI:  3,  Ad).22
(ii) The  Subsidies  Code
In 1979  the  Subsidies  Code  emerged  out  of the  Tokyo  Round  of
multilateral  trade  negotiations.  There  are  now  over  90 Contracting  Parties  to
GATT  but  by  mid-1986  only  about  a third  of these  had signed  the  Subsidies
Code. Developing  countries  in  particular  have  been  reluctant  to sign  it.  The
Code  is  an "Agreement  on Interpretation  and  Application"  of the  relevant
Articles  (VI,  XVI,  and  XXIII)  of the  GATT.  Thus,  the  Code  does  not  replace
any  of the  Articles  of the  GATT  and  where  particular  matters  are  not  dealt
with in  the  Code,  the  provisions  of the  GATT  must be presumed  to remain. For
example,  although  the  dual  pricing  test  (Article  XVI:  4) is  not  referred  to in
the  Code,  it  remains  on the  books  --  though  it is  not  utilized  (Hufbauer  and
Shelton-Erb,  1984,  pp.  47-8).
An important  consideration  concerning  the  SubsidQBs  Code (and  the
other  Codes  and  Framework  Agreement  negotiated  at the  Tokyo  Round)  is  whether
the  provisions  of  the  Code  should  be applied  only to  other  signatories  to the
Code,  or whether  they  should  apply  to  all  contracting  parties  to GATT.  The
matter  is  not  unimportant,  for  under  a grandfather  clause  of  GATT,  the  United
States  is  not  required  to  apply  an "injury  test"  in  order  to  levy  counter-
vailing  duties  against  subsidies  granted  by other  countries,  whether  or  not
they  are  signatories  to  GATT.  (That  is,  the  "material  injury"  requirement  of
Article  VI: 6(a)  of  GATT  does  not  apply  to  the  United  States  in that  it  was
not  consistent  with  the  U.S.  countervailing  duty  legislation  that  existed  at23
the  time  the  GATT  was  first  signed.)-/ Under  the  Code,  however,  the  United
States  is requir;d  to  establish  that  there  is  material  injury  to a domestic
industry  prior  to impose  countervailing  duties. The  United  States  maintains
that  this  provision  applies  only  with respect  to  other  signatories  to the
Code.  Some  other  countries  argue  that  Article  I of the  GATT  has  primacy--that
"any  advantage,  favour,  privilege  or immunity  granted  by any  contracting  party
to  any  product  originating  in  or destined  for  any  other  cuuntry  shall  be
accorded  immediately  and  unconditionally  to  the  like  product  originating  in  or
destined  for  the  territories  of  all  other  contracting  parties." What is  at
issue  is  unconditional  most-favored-nation  (MFN)  treatment,  a fundamental
principle  of the  X  'T,  expressed  in its  first  Article. The  attitude  that  the
provisions  of the  Codes  should  be applied  only  to  other  signatories  of the
relevant  Code  is  one  of conditional  not  unconditional  MFN (Hufbauer,  Shelton-
Erb  and  Starr,  1980,  pp.  59-70)  and  is an important  departure  from  the  trading
principles  established  in the  post-World  War II  negotiations.  (Snape,  1988)
The  Subsidies  Code  distinguishes  between  agricultural2-  and  other
products,  between  developed  and  developing  countries,  and  between  export
subsidies  and  other  types  of subsidies.  Though  not  as clear  as it  might  be --
1.  This  exemption  from  the  injury  test  applies  only  with  regard  to products
which  are  dutiable  on import  to the  United  States. Thus  inter  alia it  does
not  appear  to apply  to imports  that  come in  duty-free  under  the  Generalized
System  of Preferences  for  developing  countries:  for  countervailing  duties  to
be applied  against  subsidized  exports  coming  in  duty-free  under  GSP,  it
appears  that  injury  has  to be established.  Also,  the  exemption  does  not  apply
to  a small  number  of countries  with  which  the  U.S.  has  trade  agreements  the
provide  for  most favoured  nation  treatment.
2. It  refers  to  "certain  primary  products"  and,  unlike  the  GATT  itself,
excludes  minerals  from  these. Neither  the  Articles  of the  GATT  nor  the  Codes
cover  services,  with  the  exception  of films  for  the  cinema.24
there  is  a  good  bit  of vagueness  which  appears  to be deliberate  --  it  also
distinguishes  between  various  levels  of injury.
The  Code  continues  the  trend  started  in  the  GATT  review  of 1955  in
attempting  to  distinguish  between  export  subsidies  and  other  subsidies  (some
of  which  may  encourage  exports)  and  in  attempting  to prohibit  export  subsidies
(except  or.  agricultural  products  and  by  developing  countries).  It provides  an
illustrative  list  of  what  are  deemed  to  be export  subsidies.l/
As far  as agriculture  is  concerned,  export  subsidies  are  not
prohibited  by the  Code  for  either  developed  or developing  countries. Instead,
the  Code  attempts,  rather  weakly,  to  define  what the  "more  than  an  equitable
share  of  world  export  trade"  is  which  signatories  should  not capture  by means
of export  subsidies  (Article  10).
Export  subsidies  on  manufactured  products  are  not  banned  for
developing  countries;  instead:  "Developing  country  signatories  agree  that
export  subsidies  on their  industrial  products  shall  not be  used in  a  manner
which  causes  serious  prejudice  to the  trade  or production  of another
signatory"  (Article  14:3),  and they  "should  endeavour  to  enter  into  a
commitment  to  reduce  or eliminate  export  subsidies  when the  use  of such  export
1.  In short,  the  list  covers  direct  subsidies  on exports,  bonuses  for
exporting  through  currency  retention  schemes,  reduced  freight  charges  for
exports,  cheap  inputs  supplied  by governments  for  use in  exports,  reduction  or
remission  of direct  taxes  with  regard  to  exports,  excessive  remission  of
indirect  taxes  (and  import  charges)  on the  products  exported  or any  exemption
or remission  of indirect  taxes  and import  charges  on inputs  into  exports
unless  the  inputs  are  physically  incorporated  into  the  export  product,
guarantees  on export  credits  or insurance  at premium  rates  that  are
"manifestly  inadequate"  to  cover  the  long-term  costs  of the  program,
subsidized  export  credits,  and  any  other  charge  on the  public  account  having
similar  effects. The  Code  list  is  not  intended  to  be exhaustive:  other
practices  may  be  deemed  to  be export  subsidies. It  will  be noted  that  the
destination  principle  for  taxation  is  adopted  for  indirect  taxes  (but  only
partly  for  indirect  taxes  on inputs)  but  not  for  direct  taxes.25
subsidies  is  inconsistent  with ...  competitive  and  development  needs"  (Article
14:5). Furthermore,  when such  a commitment  has  been  entered  into,
countermeasures  which  might  otherwise  be  authorized  on a multilateral  basis
against  the  export  subsidies,  may  not  be  undertaken  by other  signatories.
These  "multilateral  actions"  from  which  they  are  excused  involve
consultations,  reconciliation  and,  ultimately,  authorization  of "such
countermeasures  as  may  be appropriate",  but  not,  of  course,  countervailing
duties  imposed  by individual  importing  countries.
For  subsidies  other  than  export  subsidies,  the  Code  takes  a somewhat
more  permissive  approach,  but  recognizes  that  they  "may  cause  or threaten  to
cause  injury  to  a domestic  industry  of another  signatory  or may  nullify  or
impair  benefits  accruing  to  the  interests  of another  signatory  under  the
General  Agreement,  in particular  where  such  subsidies  would  adversely  affect
the  conditions  of  normal  competition.  Signatories  shall  therefore  seek  to
avoid  causing  such  effects  through  the  use  of subsidies"  (Article  11:2). It
is  even  more  permissive  regarding  such  subsidies  when  they  are  granted  by
developing  countries,  in  that  the  multilateral  track  for  action  may  not  be
taken  against  them  unless  nullification  or impairment  of tariff  concessions  or
other  obligations  under  GATT  is found  to exist. While  at the  end  of it  all,
there  appears  to  be little  or  no differentiation  between  developed  and
developing  in the  action  that  an importing  country  can  take  through  the
imposition  of  countervailing  duties  against  subsidies,  there  is  a considerable
"understanding"  written  into  the  Code  regarding  the  use  of subsidies  in
developing  countries.  For  example:
Signatories  recognize  that  subsidies  are  an
integral  part  of economic  development  programmes
of  developing  countries  (Article  14:1);26
Signatories  recognize  that  in  developing
countries,  governments  may play  a large  role  in
promoting  economic  growth  and  development  (Article
14:7).
But  in  view  of the  similarity  of possible  countervailing  action,  this
understanding  does  not  appear  to  amount  to  much.
Permitted  remedies  under  the  Code  are  complex  and,  as noted,  include
both  national  action  on the  initiative  of an importing  country  and
multilaterally  authorized  actions.  The  latter  vary  according  to  many factors
including  whether  they  are  in response  to export  subsidies  or other  subsidies,
whether  the  subsidies  are  on agricultural  or  other  products,  and  whether  the
subsidies  are  given  by  developed  or  developing  countries. On this
multilateral  track,  consultations  between  the  parties  are the  most  common  form
of  action. More important  to date  and  in the  foreseeable  future,  are  the
provisions  for  countervailing  duties  to  be imposed  by  an importing  country,
although  for  action  against  subsidies  that  affect  another  country's  exports  to
a third  marke 1. the  multilateral  path  is  likely  to continue  to be the  only
feasible  one. To date,  however,  this  track  has  proved  to  be slow  and  rather
ineffective,  as illustrated  by the  Brazilian  and  Australian  experiences
relating  to subsidized  EEC  sugar  exports,  and  by  a continuing  fight  spanning
many  years  between  the  U.S.  and  the  EEC  regarding  pasta  subsidies  --  the  issue
here  hinges  on  whether  pasta  is  a primary  product  and  on the  size  of refunds
to pasta  exporters  of the  excess  cost  of  wheat  purchased  under  the  EEC's
Common  Agricultural  Policy. (Stern,  Jackson  and  Hoekman,  1986,  p.29,  and
Financial  Times,  July  21, 1987) While  the  extent  of injury  to  an industry
that  needs  to  be demonstrated  for  multilaterally-authorized  action  is
generally  less  than  for  countervailing  duties  to  be imposed  by national27
authorities  after  their  own  investigation,  the  wheels  of the  multilateral  gods
grind  slowly,  and  often  ineffectively.
Thus,  the  main source  of remedy  is in  unilaterally  determined
countervailing  duties. These  can  be imposed  not  only  against  those  subsidies
that  are  proscribed  by the  GATT  or the  Subsidies  Code,  but  also  against  those
which  are  not  proscribed:  material  injury  or threat  thereof  to  an industry  in
an importing  country  is the  crucial  element.  Part  I of the  Subsidies  Code
specifies  the  procedures  which  countries  should  follow  in  conducting
investigations  into  whether  material  injury  has  (or  will)  occur,  and
principles  for  determining  the  causal  link  between  subsidized  imports  and  the
injury. The  Code  provides  for  visible  and  public  investigation,  for
consultations,  and  also states  that  it  is the  size  of the  subsidy,  and  not  the
amount  of injury,  that  should  determine  the  limits  to the  countervailing
duty. The  Code  provides  for  price  undertakings  by exporters  (that  would
remove  the  source  of the  injury)  to be entered  into,  in  lieu  of countervailing
duties. It  also states  that  in  determining  injury  there  should  be "an
objective  examination  of both  (a)  the  volume  of subsidized  imports  and  their
effect  on prices  of the  domestic  market  for  like  products  and (b)  the
consequent  impact  of these  imports  on  domestic  producers  of such  products"
(Article  6:1).  It  lists  factors  to be taken  into  account  in  determining  the
impact  on prices  and  on domestic  producers,  but  the  attempt  is  far  from
satisfactory,  as the  Code  itself  implies. While  as far  as countervailing
actions  are  concerned,  there  is  no differentiation  betwien  export  and  other
subsidies,  an export  subsidy  would  normally  be in  breach  of  a signatory's
obligations  under  the  Code  and  therefore  could  attract  more severe28
multilaterally-authorized  (though  nationally  determined  and  imposed)  action
than  other  subsidies.
VI.  Agriculture
From  the  beginning,  agriculture  has been  a problem  for  GATT,  and  much
of the  problem  has surrounded  the  question  of subsidies  and their  control.
The  CATT  allows  restrictions  of imports  where  they  are  necessary  to complement
domestic  restrictions  on  agricultural  or fishery  production.  This  provision
was introduced  to  accommodate  the  farm  price  support  programme  of the  U.S.
The  accommodation  proved  to  be inadequate,  and in  1951  the  U.S.  Congress
passed  legislation  which  could  require  the  President  to  take  action  against
imports  that  was inconsistent  with  U.S.  obligations  under  the  CATT. As a
result  in 1955  the  U.S.  sought  and  obtained  a  waiver  from  the  relevant  GATT
obligations  regarding  agriculture;  other  countries  then  followed. As was
detailed  above,  much  of agriculture  was  thus  removed  from  GATT coverage  with
respect  to  barriers  to imports. The  price  supports  (subsidies)  that  are
buttressed  by these  barriers  were thereby  sustained  and  encouraged.
With  the  growth  of protected  European  agricultural  production  and
exports,  the  interests  of the  U.S.  with  respect  to  agriculture  have  changed
substantially.  Long  having  been  the  leading  proponent  of discipline  on
subsidies  for  manufactured  products,  the  U.S.  has  now  joined  other
agricultural  exporters  in  pressing  for  the  discipline  to be  extended  to
agriculture.  During  the  Tokyo  Round,  the  U.S.  and  the  EEC  clashed  repeatedly
on the  attempt  by the  U.S.  to  bring  agriculture  under  the  general  rule  of GATT29
(Winham,  1987,  pp.156-7),  an irony  since  it  was  the  U.S. that  led  agriculture
out.
The  problems  of excess  agricultural  production  received  attention  at
the  Tokyo  (1986)  and  Venice  (1987)  summit  meetings  of the  heads  of  government
of the  seven  leading  developed  nations. Also  the  August  1986  Ministerial
Meeting  of the  "Cairns"  group  of fourteen  countries  that  describe  themselves
as fair  traders  in  agriculture  "undertook  to seek  the  removal  of  market  access
barriers,  substantial  reductions  of agricultural  subsidies  and  the
elimination,  within  an agreed  period,  of subsidies  affecting  agricultural
trade"  within  the  context  of multilateral  trade  negotiations.  In  the  next
month  the  Ministerial  Declaration  that  launched  the  Uruguay  Round  of
multilateral  trade  negotiations  stated  that  the  Contracting  Parties  to  GATT
had  agreed  that  negotiatons  would  seek  to improve  "GATT  disciplines  relating
to  all  subsidies  and  countervailing  measures  that  affect  international  trade"
and that  for  agriculture  in  particular  "negotiations  shall  aim  to achieve
greater  liberalization  of trade  [by]  ... increasing  discipline  on the  use  of
all  direct  and  indirect  subsidies  and  other  measures  affecting  directly  or
indirectly  agricultural  trade,  including  the  phased  reduction  of their
negative  effects  and  dealing  with their  causes". Although  it is  not  a  member
of the  Cairn_  group,  the  U.S.  has put  on the  table  in  the  Uruguay  Round
negotiations  a proposal  that  countries  drop  all  forms  of farm  support  by 1998.
Presumably  this  would  imply  that  all the  provisions  that  apply  in  the  GATT for
taking  action  against  subsidies  that  promote  exports  of  manufactured  products,
would  be  extended  to the  products  of agriculture.  Finally,  in  the  U.S.-Canada
Free  Trade  Agreement  signed  on October  3, 1987  "The  Parties  have  agreed  that
their  primary  goal  with  respect  to  agricultural  subsidies  is to  achieve,  on a30
global  basis,  the  elimination  of all  subsidies  which  distort  agricultural
trade  and  agree  to  work together  to  achieve  this  goal,  including  through
multilateral  trade  negotiations  such  as the  Uruguay  Round".  They  also
restricted  a number  of subsidies  and introduced  notification  and  dispute
settlement  procedures  with  respect  to  countervailing  (and  anti-dumping)
duties.
VII. Countervailing  Duty  Action
The  United  States  has  viewed  the  Subsidies  Code  as a  means  to  bring
changes  in the  trade  policies  of other  countries,  while  others  have feared
over-enthusiastic  application  of CVD  (and  anti-dumping)  procedures. (Beseler
and  Williams,  1986,  pp.  9,16;  Stern  and  Hoekman,  1987,  p. 61)  As noted  above
the  U.S.  has  insisted  on applying  the  benefits  of the  Code  not  just  to other
signatories  of the  Code,  rather  than  to all  members  of the  GATT,  which  in
itself  is  an action  of doubtful  legality  (Jackson  ... ),  but  only  to those
signatories  that  have  adjusted  their  subsidy  policies  in  a manner  that  the
U.S.  judges  to  be in conformity  with  the  Code.  (Hubauer  and  Shelton  Erb,
1984,  Appendix  B)  The  Code  does  provide  for  non-application  between  any  two
signatories  at the  discretion  of either;  only  the  United  States  appears  to
have  used  this  provision  as a  means  to secure  policy  adjustments.  The
carrot/stick  element  of this  as  noted  above  is that,  due  to  a grandfather
provision  of the  GATT  the  U.S.  does  not  apply  an injury  test  prior  to the
imposition  of countervailing  duties  against  sudsidized  imports  from  any31
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country  other  than  those  that  have  signed  the  Code  and  which  the  U.S.  judges
to  have  fulfilled  the  provisions  of the  Code.
In  addition  to this  restriction  of the  benefits  of the  Code,  the  U.S.
is  by far  the  largest  initiator  of countervailing  duty  actions. Table  1,
which  is  drawn  from  data  compiled  under  the  direction  of Michael  Finger  at the
World  Bank,  shows  that  of 460  countervailing  duty  cases  by all  countries  over
the  first  seven  years  of the  decade,  281  of them  were in the  United  States.
Chile  accounted  for  140,  nearly  all  prior  to  March  1983,  and  virtually  all  not
sustained.  (Finger  and  Nogues,  1987,  p.713.)  Chile's  actions  followed  a  very
rapid  dismantling  of other  trade  barriers  in  that  country,  and  have  been
regarded  by some  other  countries  as  misuse  of the  CVD  provisions  of the
Code.1/
Table  1  also shows  that  the  major  initiators  of countervailing  duty
cases  had  relatively  few  actions  taken  against  them. To a large  extent  this
is  due  to the  fact  that  the  most  subsidized  exports  of the  United  States  and
Europe  are  agricultural  products  that  injure  industries  not  in the  importing
countries,  but  in  other  exporters. In such  circumstances  there  is little  or
no incentive  in the  importing  country  to take  countervailing  duty
initiatives.  It is  also  true  that  many  non-initiators  use  other  forms  of
barriers  to imports,  often  in  a concealed  form  and  with  considerable
bureaucratic  discretion,  instead  of the  highly  transparent  countervailing  duty
procedures.
The  targets  of CVD  actions  form  a much larger  set  of the  countries
than  the  initiators.  With  or  without  the  Chilean  cases  ,  Brazil  is  the  most
1.  It is  reported  that  Chile  ceased  to initiate  countervailing  duty  actions
following  threats  of retaliation. (Finger  and  Nogues,  1987,  p.713n.)33
frequent  --  indeed  speaking  a Romance  language  appears  to correlate  well  with
being  a targetl About  60  per  cent  of all  cases  were  against  developing
countries,  and  only  one  percent  against  non-market  economies.  (Finger  and
Olechowski,  1987,  Table  A 8.1  and  Nam, 1987,  Table  1.)
A CVD  action  may  result  in  a countervailing  duty  being  imposed  or in
the  exporter  agreeing  to  desist  from  subsidizing  or to  raise  the  export  price.
Such  outcomes  are  successful  from  the  point  of view  of the  petitioner.  On the
other  hand it  may  be determined  that  there  was  no subsidization  or  no injury
(in  the  relevant  sense)  --  these  outcomes  would  be  unfavourable  to the
petitioner.  As a third  possibility  the  case  could  be withdrawn  either
voluntarily  or under  duress. Of all  the  products  for  which  cases  were
initiated  and  decided  over  the  seven  year  period,  and  excluding  Chile  for
which  only  one  of its  140  cases  was  decided  in favor  of the  petitioner,  about
60 percent  of cases  gave  the  petitioner  a favourable  outcome. The  figure  was
55  percent  for  the  U.S.
An unfavorable  decision  for  the  petitioner  does  not imply  that  the
foreign  exporter  is  not  harmed. Unlike  domestic  legal  cases,  there  is  no
possibility  of "costs"  being  awarded  against  the  plaintiff,  to be paid  to  an
innocent  defendant. Thus  there  is  a relatively  small  disincentive  for  a firm
that  is suffering  from  import  competition  to  petition  for  a CVD,  particularly
where,  as in the  U.S.,  a political  climate  has  been  fostered  regarding  the
unfair  trading  practices  of some  foreigners  and  CVD  actions  are  seen  by the
government  as a disciplinary  action  on these  foreigners.  Many CVD  actions,
and  particularly  by the  U.S.,  are  widely  viewed  as  a form  of  harassment  of
foreign  exporters.  (Finger  and  Nogues,  1987,  pp.713-22).34
VIII.  Evaluation  of the  Subsidies  Code
There  is  a common  view that  the  Subsidies  Code  has  not  worked  well.
Judgement  should,  of course,  be formed  on the  basis  of the  objectives  of those
who sought  the  control  of subsidies,  in  relation  to other  means  of achieving
the  same  aims,  and  by an  assessment  of the  aims  themselves.
The  provisions  of the  Code  for  agriculture  are  weak  and  ineffective,
in  part  reflecting  the  determination  of the  European  Economic  Community  and
some  other  countries  to  keep  agricultural  issues  separate.  (Winham,  1986,
Ch.4)  From  the  viewpoint  of efficient  agricultural  exporting  countries,  the
Code  fails  seriously  at this  point. The longstanding  indifference  to  the
position  of these  exporters  has  been  a source  of continual  frustration  for
them.  So too  was the  1982  Ministerial  Meeting  of the  Contracting  Parties  of
the  GATT,  the  final  declaration  of  which  the  Australian  trade  minister  angrily
refused  to sign. As noted  above,  some  action  directed  at agricultural
subsidies  is  now  more  likely  to be taken,  with the  formation  of the  Cairns
Group  of agricultural  exporting  countries,  and  heightened  U.S.  concern
regarding  barriers  to  its  exports. Statements  from  the  summit  meetings  of the
G7 countries,  apparent  effective  inclusion  in the  Uruguay  Round  of  MTN
negotiations,  and  the  tabling  of a  very  challenging  position  by the  U.S.  in
these  negotiations,  reflect  this  likelihood.  On the  other  hand  the
determination  of some  governments  (or  at least  some  parts  of them)  in  Europe,
Japan,  and  the  U.S.  to  maintain  high  prices  for  farmers  severely  circumscribes
feasible  action. Exports  resulting  from  price  support  may  be curtailed,  but
it is less  likely  that  price  support  will  be significantly  reduced  in  these35
countries  unless  it is brought  much  more  under  public  scrutiny,  for  example  by
placing  more  of the  burden  of it on  government  budgets.
As far  as  manufactured  products  were  concerned  in  the  negotiations  of
the  Subsidies  Code,  there  was  a  marked  difference  between  th-  United  States
and  other  participants.  The  U.S.  was  particularly  concerned  to secure
discipline  over  other  countries'  export-promoting  subsidies.  Other  countries
were  more  concerned  that  discipline  should  be imposed  on the  use,  by the  U.S.,
of countervailing  duties  (Finger  and  Nogues,  1987,  p. 713 and  Messerlin,  1986),
the  main  focus  being  the  grandfathered  absence  of a requirement  that  injury  to
an industry  be established  as  a condition  of the  imposition  of CVDs. As the
U.S.  now  requires  the  injury  test  for  exports  of those  countries  it judges  to
have  fulfilled  the  requirements  of the  Code,  in this  regard  the  Code  must  be
judged  at least  a partial  success  by those  who  negotiated  it.
Since  the  acceptance  of the  Subsidies  Code,  however, use  by the  U.S.
of the  CVD  machinery  has  increased  greatly. It  is  not clear  to  what  extent
each  of the  following  has  contributed  to  this:  (a)  the  change  in the  U.S.
trading  position  leading  to  more  import  competing  industries  seeking  redress
against  injury;  (b)  active  encouragement  by the  U.S.  Administration  of actions
designed  to  exercise  discipline  over  the  trading  policies  of  other
countries; (c)  possibly  increased  use  of subsidies  by  other  countries; (d)
reduced  tariff  barriers  negotiated  in the  Tokyo  Round  exposing  more  industries
to import  competition;  and (e)  increased  reliance  on litigation  in general  as
a means  to alleviate  economic  problems. Possibly  all  have  contributed.
Use  by other  countries  of  CVD  procedures  has  also  increased  since  the
negotiation  of the  Code  --  European  countries  typically  had  used  anti-dumping
duties  rather  than  CVDs,  while  until  1982  Japan  had  used  neither. (Stern,36
Jackson  and  Hoekman,  1986,  p. 27)  To the  extent  that  CVD  actions  are  a  more
transparent  means  by  which  to seek  protection  than  many  alternative  means  --
this  transparency  being  in  aim  of the  U.S.  negotiators  --  this  greater  use  of
CVDs  can  be regarded  as success  for  the  Code,  and  a move  towards  trade
liberalization.  But  to the  extent  that  these  CVD  actions  have  just  added
another  avenue  for  protection,  as is  argued  by some,  the  Code  will  have
failed. The  evidence  is  not  yet  clear  on this  issue.
What is  clear  however,  is that  considerable  tension  has  been
generated  as the  U.S.  has  negotiated  with some  c  antries  regarding  the
eligibility  of those  countries  for  the  "injury  test"  (Hufbauer  and  Shelton
Erb,  1984,  p. 122  and  Winham,  1986,  pp.  359-60),  and  as  markedly  different
perceptions  of what  constitutes  a subsidy  have  been  manifest. Those  few  cases
that  have  been  brought  under  the  multilateral  machinery  of  GATT  and  the  Code
--  predominantly  regarding  agricultural  subsidies  --  have  aired,  if not
accentuated,  discord,  and  generally  they  have  not  been  settled  to  anyone's
satisfaction.  (Teese,  1982, Hathaway,  1987,  p. 106, Messerlin,  1986)
Are  export-promoting  subsidies  increasing?  There  is  a general
perception  that  they  are,  both  for  agriculture  and  other  products,  but  whether
this  is so  or simply  a perception  as they  come  more  into  focus,  is  not
evident. What is  even  less  evident  is  what  they  would  be in the  absence  of
GATT  and the  Subsidies  Code.  However  it  is  apparent  that  neither  subsidies
themselves,  nor  anti-dumping  actions,  have  been  constrained  to  the  extent  that
those  who  pressed  for  them  in the  Tokyo  Round  had  hoped. In  addition  more
discord  has  attended  the  subject  than  they  probably  expected. A consideration
of alternatives  is  appropriate.37
IX.  Alternatives
While  economists  may argue  that  subsidies,  like  other  government
distortions  of international  trade,  generally  do  more  harm to  the  country
imposing  them  than  to others  and  do less  harm  to all  than  other  ways  of
achieving  similar  objectives,  this  is  not the  common  perception.  To a very
large  extent  it is  the  injury  which  subsidies  may  bring  to industries  in  other
countries  that  makes  them  of international  concern,  not the  subsidies
themselves.  Even in  the  U.S. there  would  be little  political  mileage  in
attacking  foreign  subsidies  that  had  no impact  on international  trade,  or on
U.S.  trade  for  that  matter. So in  contemplating  options  for  the  future  in the
field  of subsidies,  one  possibility  that  appeals  to  many  economists  (and
others)  is  to drop  the  seatch  for  causes  of international  competition  and  to
focus  on the  consequences.  There  are  at least  three  major  problems  with this
approach:  (i)  the  view  that is  widely  held  in the  U.S.,  that  foreign
governments  are  using  subsidies  as an element  of strategic  trade  policy  and
that  they  need to  be tackled  head-on; (ii)  the  idea  of "unfair"  competition
is  useful  for  those  seeking  protection,  for  it is  a  potent  political  concept,
and  they  will seek  to retain  it  unless  they  can  get  the  same  assistance
through  other  means;  and (iii)  while  a  government  can  deal  with  the
consequences  of foreign  competition  in its  domestic  market,  its  options  to do
so in  foreign  markets  are  limited. So  before  considering  options  for
international  action  that  involve  indirect,  rather  than  direct,  attacks  on
export  promoting  subsidies,  attention  is  given  to  a possible  improvement  more
or  less  within  the  current  framework.38
(i)  Ignore  Domestic  Subsidies
This  change  would  continue  to  admit  the  powerful  political  appeal  of
"unfair"  trade  but  would  also  acknowledge  the  practical  problems  of specifying
and  measuring  any  subsidies  except  export  subsidies  and  the  international
tensions  that  are  generated  by  attempting  to  discipline  them  directly. For
this  purpose  an export  subsidy  could  be defined  as any  policy  that
distinguished  according  to  destination,  that  is  between  domestic  and  foreign
sales. This  is  much in  line  with  the  Subsidies  Code  concept  of  an export
subsidy. As under  the  present  regime,  export  subsiuies  could  be both
proscribed  and countervailable.  However,  countervailable  actions  would  be
limited  to  export  subsidies  alone,  leaving  domestic  subsidies  untouched  by
countervailing  actions,  proscription,  or exhortation.  Retaining  the
proscription  of export  subsidies  would  enable  action  to  be taken  in a
multilateral  context  when  a country's  exports  are  "damaged"  by the  export
subsidies  of another  country,  in  a third  market.
The second  and  third  proposals,  whic'i  are  not  alternatives  to each
other  but  can  be regarded  as complementary,  are  rather  more  radical  in that
they  implicitly  drop  the  distinction  between  fair  and  unfair  trade  and  attack
export  subsidies  indirectly  rather  than  directly.
(ii)  Ignore  the  Source  of Injury
It is unlikely  that  countries  vill  foresake  all  provisions  for
safeguarding  industries  against  foreign  competition.  Such  safeguarding  could
be  greatly  simplified  if  the  current  distinction  between  fair  and  unfair  trade
as a cause  of injury  could  be  dropped. From  an economic  point  of view it
would,  of course,  be  preferable  if  the  criteria  of injury  for  "safeguardiig"39
against  injury  could  then  be amended  to  focus  on  economy-wide  rather  than
industry-specific  effects, But  even  without  this  amendment,  much  could  be
gained  in  simplicity  by repealing  the  special  provisions  covering  subsidies
and  dumping  and  relying  on the  general  safeguard  provisions  of Article  XIX  of
GATT,  which  cover  injury  from  "fair"  competition,  together  with  the
nullification  and impairment  provision  of  Article  XXIII.  (See  Barcelo,  1984;
Corden,  1983,  1987) Simplification  and  consistency--and  less  protection
through  the  "harassment"  of  exporters--would  be achieved  by getting  all  injury
cases  on the  one  track  with the  exception  of "damage"  in  third  markets  where,
as now,  action  can  be taken  under  the  nullification  and impairment  provisions
(Article  XXIII).
While  this  path  has  much  appeal,  the  following  points  should  be noted
if reliance  is to be placed  on the  existing  safeguard  Article  XIX (Barcelo,
1977,  pp.  842  ff.)
o Unlike  the  Subsidies  and  Anti-Dumping  Codes,  the  Article
provides  that  the  country  taking  action  should  grant  offsetting  "concessions",
or face  the  possibility  of retaliation.
o  Action  taken  under  Article  XIX  must  be non-discriminatory:  if
applied  to any,  it  must  be  applied  to imports  from  all  sources. This  may
appear  to discriminate  against  those  who  do not  subsidize  (or  dump),  but  such
would  be a consequence  of  abandoning  the  distinction  between  fair  and  unfair
changes  in the  prices  of imports. Allowing  selectivity  of  Article  XIX
safeguard  actions  has  been  sought  by  many  countries,  but  it  would  be  a very
high  price  to  pay.  (See  Tumlir,  1985)40
o  Actions  under  Article  XIX  are  viewed  as temporary,  giving  time
for  adjustment.  Action  against  subsidies  and  dumping,  on the  other  hand,  has
no such  adjustment  presumption.  The  difference  in  practice  does  not  appear
significant,  however.
o  Barriers  under  Article  XIX  can  be raised  to  any  extent  %o
ameliorate  the  injury. Unlike  countervailing  or anti-dumping  duties  they  are
not limited  by the  cause  of the  trouble.
o  Article  XIX  requires  "serious"  not  "material"  (or  less)  injury,
and  this  is  regarded  as being  a  higher  injury  test.
o  The  United  States  legislation  for  Article  XIX  action  requires
the  imports  to  be a "substantial  cause"  of injury--not  less  than  some  other
cause. Countervailing  or Anti-Dumping  duties  can  be imposed  when  the  subsidy
or dumping  makes  a much  lesser  contribution  to injury  of the  relevant
industry.
o  Within  the  U.S.  one  effect  of this  change  would  be to reduce  the
automaticity  of relief  action,  leaving  more  discretion  with  the  President,  and
making  action  and  procedures  less  subject  to  appeal  through  the  courts.
(iii)  Attack  Barriers  Only
It is  apparent  that  barriers  to  trade  inflict  much  more  harm  on
countries  as a  whole  than  do those  actions  that  promote  trade,  and  also  that
most  of the  subsidies  that  have  a significant  impact  on international  trade,
are  buttressed  by  barriers  to imports.  (Snape,  1987) All  production  and
export  subsidies  raise  the  returns  to domestic  producers. They  also  impose  a
cost  on national  treasuries.  The  cost  on treasuries  is  decreased  if,  for  any
level  of price  support,  these  subsidies  are  complemented  by barriers  to41
imports  of competing  products  --  these  barriers  enable  the  domestic  price  to
be raised  above  world  prices  and thus  put  part  of the  cost  of price  support  on
domestic  buyers  of the  product  rather  than  on the  national  treasury. Reducing
the  barriers  to imports  would  thus  place  a greater  cost  on the  national
treasury  for  the  same  level  of  price  support. For  whatever  reason,  assistance
by  means  of barriers  to imports  appears  much  easier  to  obtain  in  most
countries  than  assistance  from  the  public  treasury. The size  of the  "subsidy
equivalent"  of  most  forms  of  barriers  to imports  --  that  is  the  cost  of the
price  support  provided  by the  import  barriers  if it  were to  be paid  for  by  a
direct  subsidy  rather  than  by barriers  to imports  --  is frequently  greeted  by
disbelief. In the  EEC  and  Japan  for  example  more  than  60 per  cent  of the
estimated  total  cost  of agricultural  policy  over  the  years  1979-81  was  paid
directly  by consumers  by  means  of price  support,  of  which  barriers  to imports
is the  essential  ingredient. (OECD,  1987,  Annex  III,  Table  3)  The  cost  to
the  EEC's  budget  of agricultural  price  support  is  already  of  major  concern.
How  much  greater  this  concern  would  be if  the  full  cost  were  placed  on the
budget. Thus the  reduction  of barriers  to imports  is itself  likely  to
constrain  export  promoting  subsidies,  including  those  subsidies  that  are
regarded  as comprising  an element  of strategic  trade  policy:  the  ability  to
attack  is somewhat  reduced  if the  domestic  market  is  unprotected.
Although  it is  an indirect  attack  on  export  promoting  subsidies,
there  are  reasons  for  thinking  that  this  approach  may  be more successful  than
attempts  to  constrain  subsidies  --  and  particularly  domestic  subsidies  --
directly. They  are  as follows:
(a)  Barriers  to imports  are  relatively  easy  to define. This  is
particularly  true  of import  tariffs  which  are  easy  to  measure  as  well  as42
define,  but  it  applies  to  most  other  forms  of import  barrier  as  well.
(b)  The  major  developed  countries  have  generally  shown  themselves  to
be  willing  to  negotiate  with  respect  to import  barriers  on  manufactured  goods
under  the  auspices  of GATT  (and  within  the  Organisation  for  European  Economic
Co-operation,  the  precursor  of the  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and
Development),  and  these  negotiations  have  proved  to  be successful.  It is true
that  these  countries  have  seen  themselves  as  natural  exporters  of a  whole
range  of  manufactured  goods  (and  importers  of others),  but  this  balance  of
exporting  and importing  interests  within  the  same  country  does  not  apply  to
agriculture  --  at least  as far  as  Japan  and  most  of Europe  are  concerned.
So it  will probably  be  easier  to  adopt  this  approach  in  manufacturing
than  in  agriculture.  The  extent  to  which  it can  be adopted  in  the  new
negotiations  in services  has  yet  to  be tested. But  given  the  continued
dispuces  that  are likely  regarding  level  playing  fields  and  fair  trade,  it is
likely  that  the  approach  that  has  by and  large  succeeded  under  the  GATT  will
increase  in  appeal.43
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